Finally, the Supreme Court of Texas held the arbitrator did not exceed his authority when he issued an award against Jefferson County.  The court said:

The County argues that the county commissioners court “eliminated” the deputy positions (along with their respective salaries) as part of its delegated legislative duty to create the county budget, and that the arbitrator effectively usurped that duty by ordering the deputies “reinstated” to a position that no longer exists. The County distinguishes between layoffs, which are governed by seniority under the CBA, and “the abolishing of positions,” which the County has unfettered authority to do. The Constables Association responds that the County’s mere disagreement with the arbitrator’s interpretation of the CBA—an issue that was properly submitted to the arbitrator— does not provide grounds to vacate the award.

We agree with the Association. The arbitrator did not quibble with the County’s right to abolish as many deputy positions as it deemed necessary or prudent, nor did he order the County to create or fund positions that no longer existed. He merely determined that, upon eliminating funding for eight deputy-constable positions, the County was required under the CBA to consider the deputies’ countywide seniority in determining which eight deputies were to be terminated. The arbitrator concluded that the County’s failure to do so violated the CBA, and he ordered the County to rectify that violation by reinstating the deputies pursuant to their seniority. The arbitrator’s analysis of the interplay between the CBA’s provisions regarding layoffs and abolishing positions may or may not be correct, but it is precisely within the scope of his contractual authority to resolve “[a]ll disputes concerning the proper interpretation and application of” the CBA. See City of Pasadena v. Smith, 292 S.W.3d 14, 20 (Tex. 2009) (“An arbitrator derives his power from the parties’ agreement to submit to arbitration . . . .”).

Common-law grounds for vacating an arbitration award are exceedingly narrow and do not include an arbitrator’s mere error in applying the law. See CVN Grp., 95 S.W.3d at 238; see also id. at 239 (holding that “an arbitrator’s mere disagreement with a judge does not violate public policy”); City of Pasadena, 292 S.W.3d at 20 (noting that “judicial review of an arbitration award is usually very narrow”). Even assuming the arbitrator erroneously interpreted the CBA, an issue we need not reach, such error does not justify the trial court’s judgment vacating the award.

Because the CBA was valid and enforceable, the deputy commissioners were considered police officers under Texas law, and the arbitrator did not exceed his authority when he issued an award against Jefferson County, the Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the appellate court’s decision upholding the arbitrator’s award.

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